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LIVESTOCK SOLD OR DESTROYED
BECAUSE OF DISEASE
— by Neil E. Harl*
Although less widely used than the provisions on the
one-year deferral of gains from livestock sold because of
drought1 and the two-year reinvestment for drought sales of
livestock held for draft, dairy or breeding purposes,2  the
provision providing relief for livestock destroyed, sold or
exchanged because of disease can be highly important to
farmers and ranchers.3
Treated as involuntary conversion
If livestock are destroyed or are sold or exchanged
because of disease, the disposition may be treated as an
involuntary conversion.4 Thus, recognition of the gain can
be avoided if the proceeds are reinvested in property similar
or related in service or use.5  The replacement period ends
two years after the close of the taxable year in which the
involuntary conversion occurs and any part of the gain is
realized.6  Amounts received are not excludable from
income if the funds are not reinvested in replacement
animals.7  The basis of the new animals must be reduced by
the unrecognized gain on the old (destroyed, sold or
exchanged) animals.8
Losses due to the death of livestock from disease,
whether from normal death loss or a disease of epidemic
proportions, are treated as an involuntary conversion.9  The
"suddenness" test need not be satisfied in order to have a
particular occurrence be considered an involuntary
conversion.10  Since animal disease does not qualify under
the "suddenness" test as a casualty, losses because of death
of livestock from disease ordinarily are not considered
casualty losses within the meaning of I.R.C. § 1231(a) and
are not entitled to the treatment afforded casualty losses
under I.R.C. § 165(c)(3).11
For the loss of animals from feed contamination, the
involuntary conversion provision is available.12  Thus, in a
1954 ruling, the disease of hyperkerotosis, acquired from
consuming lubricants in pelleted feed, made the livestock
consuming the feed eligible for involuntary conversion
treatment.13
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled, however, that
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dwarfism in beef cattle is not a disease so the sale of a herd
which had developed the dwarf gene is not eligible for
involuntary conversion treatment.14  The problem is one of
genetics, not of disease.15
Livestock exposed to disease are considered sold or
exchanged under this provision.16
A question has been raised as to the scope of the term
"livestock," which is included in the statute rather than
"animals."17  The term "livestock" is not defined in the
involuntary conversion statute but is defined in I.R.C. §
1231.18  In that provision, the term "livestock" includes
"cattle, hogs, horses, mules, donkeys, sheep, goats, fur-
bearing animals and other mammals.”19  The term, as
defined in that provision, does not include poultry,
chickens, turkeys, pigeons, geese, other birds, fish, frogs or
reptiles.20  Nonetheless, the destruction of honeybees as a
result of pesticide application has been ruled to be an
involuntary conversion.21  In that ruling, a beekeeper
qualified for indemnity payments for the loss of honeybees
as a result of pesticide use near the beehives.2 2  The
destruction of the honeybees was considered a casualty,
eligible for a casualty loss where the payments were less
than the taxpayer's basis in the property.23
Environmental or soil contamination
An additional provision, enacted in 1978, applies to the
replacement of livestock with other farm property in the
event of environmental or soil contamination.24  If it is not
feasible to reinvest the proceeds from compulsorily or
involuntarily converted livestock in property similar or
related in use to the livestock converted, other property
(including real property) used for farming purposes may be
treated as similar or related in service or use to the livestock
converted.25  In a 1985 case involving the sale of breeding
cattle because of brucellosis ("Bang's" disease) which made
the animals unsuitable for breeding, the communicable
disease was not considered to be an environmental
contaminant.26  In that case, the sale did not qualify for the
environmental contamination provision.27
It is important to note that only in the case of
environmental contamination would the taxpayer have the
option of replacing involuntarily converted livestock with
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other farm property.28  In the event of loss from disease, the
reinvestment must be in replacement animals.29
In a 1985 U.S. District Court case,30 involving loss of
cattle from brucellosis, the taxpayer argued that the bacteria
or organisms causing the disease were transmitted to the
animals from the environment.  Had the court bought that
argument, the proceeds could have been invested in "other
farm property."31  The court held that such a result would
render the animal disease provision impotent which the
court was unwilling to do.32
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The debtors had requested a
discharge at the end of their plan period but a creditor
objected that all disposable income had not been paid to the
trustee. The debtors argued that 326 calves should not have
been included in the debtors’ assets because the calves were
not of marketable weight during the plan period. The court
held that, although the calves would not receive full value,
the calves did have some value and that value would be
included in the debtors’ assets as disposable income.  The
debtors also argued that government payments received
after the end of the plan period should not have been
included in disposable income. The court held that the
payments were included because the payments related to
activities which occurred during the plan. The debtors
argued that payments made on a real estate loan and for real
property taxes during the plan period reduced the disposable
income. The court found that the loan payments and taxes
were not due until after the plan period was over; therefore,
the court held that the payments did not reduce disposable
income. In re Hammrich, 98 F.3d 388 (8th Cir. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor had first filed for
Chapter 7 and, when that case was completed, filed for
Chapter 13. The IRS filed only a small claim for taxes and
penalties, but the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan provided for full
payment of a much larger tax claim filed by the debtor but
did not include some employment taxes. The IRS had notice
of the Chapter 13 action but failed to object or appeal the
plan or discharge in the Chapter 13 case. However, the IRS
made several attempts to collect the unpaid taxes by
assessment, letter and levy against the debtor’s property and
wages. With each violation of the automatic stay, the IRS
abated its efforts after contact by the debtor’s attorney. The
debtor sought recovery of attorney’s fees necessitated by the
IRS’s six violations of the automatic stay. The court rejected
the IRS argument that the IRS made the collection attempts
because the IRS reasonably believed that the taxes were not
discharged in the Chapter 13 case. The court held that the
IRS argument was inconsistent with its actions to halt
collection after each contact by the debtor’s attorney. The
court awarded the debtor $1,500 in attorney’s fees and
related travel costs incurred by the debtor. In re Thibodaux,
201 B.R. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
Although the IRS received notice of the debtors’ Chapter
7 case, the IRS made a post-petition levy against the
debtors’ bank account causing several checks issued by the
debtors to incur insufficient funds charges when the checks
were returned unpaid to local merchants. The debtors sought
recovery of the charges, $2,000 for “trauma and
embarrassment” and punitive damages. The court allowed
